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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Panel 4. New Acquisition Paradigms 
Wednesday, May 16, 2012  
11:15 a.m. – 
12:45 p.m. 
Chair: Elliott Branch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and 
Procurement), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development 
and Acquisition) 
Discussant: Lenn Vincent, RADM, USN (Ret.), Industry Chair, Defense Acquisition 
University 
Contracting as a Science 
David Lamm, Naval Postgraduate School 
The Case to Widen Defence Acquisition Research Paradigms 
Kevin Burgess and David Moore 
Cranfield University 
Elliott Branch—Mr. Branch is the executive director for acquisition and logistics management in the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition). He is the 
senior career civilian responsible for acquisition, contracting, and logistics policy that governs the 
operation of the Navy’s worldwide, multibillion-dollar acquisition system. Mr. Branch is the principal 
civilian advisor to the Navy Acquisition Executive for procurement matters and the community leader 
of the Navy’s contracting workforce. 
Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Branch was the first civilian director of contacts at the 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). In that role, he led one of the largest and most complex 
procurement organizations in the federal government. As the senior civilian for contracting at 
NAVSEA, Mr. Branch was responsible for the contractual oversight of the nation’s most complex 
shipbuilding and weapons systems procurement programs. His duties involved the obligation and 
expenditure of approximately $20 billion annually. 
He is a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES). Members of the SES serve in the key 
positions just below the top presidential appointees. They are the major link between these 
appointees and the rest of the federal workforce. SES members operate and oversee nearly every 
government activity in approximately 75 federal agencies. 
Mr. Branch spent time in the private sector, where he specialized in acquisition and project 
management education, training, and consulting for the federal workforce and its associated 
contractors. In this role, Mr. Branch was responsible for the design, development, delivery, and 
maintenance for a wide variety of course material ranging from project management to contract law. 
Mr. Branch’s clients included Computer Sciences Corporation, QSS Group, BAE Systems, the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and State. 
Prior to that, he served as the chief procurement officer for the government of the District of 
Columbia, where he was the agency head responsible for procurement operations, policy, and for 
formulating legislative proposals for local and congressional consideration. Mr. Branch led a staff of 
over 200 employees that supported over 40 city agencies, administered a $15 million annual 
operating budget, and oversaw the placement of $1.5 billion, annually, in city contracts. 
Before joining the District government, Mr. Branch held various positions in the SES with the 
Department of the Navy (DoN). In 1993, he became a member of the SES as the director for the 
Shipbuilding Contracts Division, at NAVSEA. He next served as executive director for acquisition and 
business management for the DoN, responsible for policy and oversight of contract operations 
throughout the entire Navy. While in this position, he also served as project executive officer for 
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acquisition related business systems. In this role, he was responsible for the formulation and 
execution of a multi-year effort to transform the Navy’s acquisition system from a paper-based system 
into one that made use of electronic technologies and methods. In this role, Mr. Branch was directly 
responsible for a portfolio of projects worth more than $200 million. 
Mr. Branch graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in economics from the University of 
Pennsylvania and completed the executive program at the University of Virginia Darden School. He 
has received the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the David Packard Excellence in 
Acquisition Award, the Presidential Rank Award for Meritorious Executive, and the Vice Presidential 
Hammer Award for Reinventing Government. 
Lenn Vincent—RADM Vincent is the industry chair, Defense Acquisition University (DAU). An 
independent consultant, RADM Vincent uses his defense and industry experience, expertise, and 
perspective to advise the DAU management team, the OSD, the uniformed Services, and industry on 
matters relative to contracting, program management, logistics, and supply chain management. As a 
professor at the DAU, he presents views to foster a more viable and effective defense acquisition 
management system. An international educator, consultant, dynamic speaker, and respected 
government and industry leader, he has taught and/or consulted in contract management, capture 
management, project management, supply chain management, and leadership. 
As a vice president at American Management Systems and CACI International, RADM Vincent 
was responsible for working with senior Department of Defense and industry leaders to build long-
term business relationships and to help identify solutions to acquisition, logistics, and financial 
management challenges. His strategic focus was an initiative to create an integrated digital 
environment that would extend the DoD’s automated procurement systems into industry and into the 
DoD program management offices, in addition to implementation and training strategies for new 
products and service. 
Prior to entering civilian life, RADM Vincent completed a distinguished career in the United States 
Navy, serving at both sea and ashore. He has over 30 years of broad based and in-depth leadership 
and management experience in acquisition, supply chain management, logistics, and financial 
management. 
When he retired on August 1, 1999, at the rank of rear admiral, he was the commandant, 
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). While in this position, he began an overhaul of 
acquisition education to include reform principles and technology-based distance learning. 
Prior to leading DSMC, RADM Vincent had served as the logistics, ordnance and fleet supply 
officer for Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, where he established policy and coordinated logistics 
requirements to support supply chain operations in the Pacific Fleet and Indian Ocean. 
RADM Vincent was the commander of the Defense Contracts Management Agency (DCMA), a 
diverse worldwide organization of 19,000 people responsible for administration and oversight of over 
400,000 contracts valued at $800 billion. Concurrently, he also served as the senior acquisition 
executive responsible for procurement policy within the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). 
Some of his other contracting assignments included assistant commander for contracts at the 
Naval Air Systems Command; commander, Defense Contract Management Command International; 
commander, Defense Contract Administration Services Region, Los Angeles; contracts director at 
Navy Inventory Control Point, Mechanicsburg; contracting officer, supervisor of shipbuilding, Bath, 
ME; and contracts director Navy Supply Center, Puget Sound. 
RADM Vincent holds a master’s in business administration from George Washington University. 
He also is a Certified Navy Material and Acquisition Professional, and is DAWIA Level III certified in 
both Contracting and Logistics. 
He is past-president of the National Contract Management Association and served on its board of 
directors as well as the following boards: Navy League National Capital Council; NDIA Washington 
DC Chapter; Board of Directors Procurement Round Table; and Board of Visitors, Defense 
Acquisition University. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=109 - 
=
The Case to Widen Defence Acquisition Research 
Paradigms 
Kevin Burgess—Burgess is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence Acquisition, Defence 
Academy of the United Kingdom, Cranfield University. His key area of interest is the role played by 
inter-organizational networks in modern supply chain practices. [k.burgess@cranfield.ac.uk] 
David Moore—Moore is the director of the Centre for Defence Acquisition, Defence Academy of the 
United Kingdom, Cranfield University. His key area of interest is in the increased professionalization 
of acquisition practitioners. [d.m.moore@cranfield.ac.uk] 
Abstract 
The rising importance of acquisition has generated a need to complement this development 
with a far wider research agenda. Historically, economic and commercial theoretical 
frameworks have dominated how procurement is conceptualised. While these 
conceptualisations will remain foundational in terms of measuring outcomes, they offer little 
by way of understanding the enablers, such as people, that facilitate the achievement of 
particular outcomes. Recent advances in public procurement practices have been sufficiently 
profound as to warrant a fundamental re-conceptualisation of what is meant by defence 
acquisition. In order to achieve a greater understanding of this re-conceptualisation, it will be 
necessary to both widen the range of topic areas examined and also expand the research 
paradigms employed. This paper concludes that an expansion in the range of research 
paradigms employed is necessary in order to better understand, account for, and integrate 
social science issues into the acquisition body of knowledge. 
Introduction 
Over the past three decades, many activities traditionally carried out by the military 
have been outsourced to the privately owned defence industrial base (DIB). This change 
has seen a movement away from procurement to acquisition. Under procurement, industry’s 
role was limited to the provision of equipment, upgrades, and equipment-focused support 
services within transactional relationships, and industry’s share of the budget focused on the 
Equipment Programme. Under acquisition, industry’s role extended into non-equipment 
areas, with products and services previously supplied separately now being grouped into 
larger integrated packages. These new arrangements allowed industry to gain more than 
the Equipment Programme element of the defence budget. They also resulted in a greater 
dependence on industry for the design, delivery, maintenance, and on-going support of 
military assets which, in turn, required moving to a closer and more collaborative working 
relationship model. More recently, government has implemented many of the 
recommendations made in reports such as Gray (2009) and Levene (2011), which will result 
in an even greater outsourcing of activities traditionally handled by the military. The 
implementation of these successive and profound changes raises the question: Are the 
traditional research methodologies previously employed to examine procurement 
phenomena adequate for modern acquisition practices? 
Background 
The shift from procurement to acquisition was underpinned by two significant global 
events—the adoption of neoliberalism and the end of the Cold War. At the macro socio-
political level, the adoption and implementation of a neoliberal ideology provided a 
justification and a rationale for greater outsourcing. Neoliberalism argues that free markets 
are able to deliver goods and services more efficiently than government agencies. This 
basic tenet led to the conclusion that government needed to change its role by reducing its 
intervention into the operation of free markets through activities such as deregulation, 
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privatisation of state-owned enterprises, elimination of international trade restrictions, and 
tax reforms. These tenets also led to the fundamental belief in a linear relationship which 
can be basically expressed as follows: the more government work done through markets, 
the greater the economic efficiencies achieved in the delivery of government services 
(Steger & Roy, 2010). 
In the 1980s, the United Kingdom (UK) government gave expression to neoliberalism 
through a wide reform programme impacting across all arms of government, known most 
commonly as New Public Management (NPM) and to a lesser extent as managerialism. 
Events such as the Falklands war in 1982 and the continuation of the Cold War meant that 
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was more able than most departments to plea a special case 
for exemptions from aggressively pursuing NPM reforms. The end of the Cold War in 1989 
significantly reduced the perceived risk to national security. The government of the UK, 
eager to cash in the peace dividend, reduced the MoD’s expenditure from 4.2% of gross 
domestic product (GDP) to 2.6%. In the post–Cold War environment, the government also 
raised its expectations on the MoD to implement NPM principles in order to save more 
money. 
Another force that gained great momentum under the adoption of neoliberalism was 
globalisation. “Globalisation’s exact meaning will continue to be the subject of debate among 
those who oppose, support or simply observe it” (Jeffery, 2002, p. 20). There is also 
considerable debate about when globalisation started and whether or not it is a good thing. 
For the purposes of this paper, globalisation is characterised by Bhagwati (2004) as the 
integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign 
investment, capital flows, migration, and the spread of technology. “For better and for worse, 
globalization has become the most powerful force shaping the world’s geopolitical 
landscape” (Cohen-Tanugi, 2008, p. 2). (See also MacGillivray, 2006; Suter, 2006; Trubek & 
Santos, 2006.) Globalisation appears to be on a strong upward trajectory. For instance, in 
1999, 20% of world output was produced in global markets ($6 trillion of the $28 trillion world 
GDP). By 2029, it is predicted that 80% of the world output will be in global markets, which 
will represent $73 trillion of the $91 trillion world GDP, a twelve-fold increase in thirty years 
(Harris & Moran, 2000). 
From a defence perspective, globalisation poses several challenges. First, it is a 
challenge to the sovereignty of the nation state—the dominant system established in Europe 
by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Despite this factor, smaller states in particular are 
inclined to give up their independence in exchange for perceived greater economic and/or 
military security. Specific examples of such arrangements include the European Union (EU), 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Second, globalisation increases risks for governments as they lose 
their monopsony position and, therefore, their ability to tightly direct defence industries 
around their own national needs and long-term interests. Capital intensive firms like military 
suppliers are abandoning reliance on a single market by pursuing global markets. For 
example, BAE, Britain’s largest defence contractor, now obtains 60% of its revenue from the 
U.S. market. Accessing larger and more lucrative markets, breaking dependence upon a 
single sovereign governmental customer, defraying the risk posed by foreign competitors in 
local markets, and accessing both cheaper means of production and a wider range of 
emerging technologies are some of the reasons suppliers find it attractive to move away 
from single-nation markets. The net result is that national governments have potentially less 
control over these firms as they are motivated by shareholder wealth creation and not 
sovereign loyalty. Third, globalisation creates several challenges around sovereign 
capability. From a military strategy perspective in terms of securing supply lines, it is 
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generally more desirable to have as few interdependencies as possible outside of a nation’s 
borders. Fourth, globalisation creates several issues with respect to knowledge 
management. It has the potential to both increase the risks in terms of ongoing supply chain 
support and create dependencies which provide the supplier with incentives and 
opportunities to behave opportunistically. However, when assessed within a neoliberal 
framework, the risks associated with sourcing from outside one’s country are seen to be 
outweighed by the increased access to new technology, skills, and innovations. Even more 
critically, it is seen as the most effective means of achieving the primary strategic goal of 
NPM—value for money (VFM).  
The VFM concept has considerable conceptual difficulties. For instance, accountants 
define it differently from economists (Flynn, 2005). Governments, however, tend to use the 
economic definition which covers not only the cost involved but also the opportunity cost. 
Under this arrangement it is always difficult to demonstrate how the money used in defence 
spending could not have delivered better value by spending it elsewhere. Despite 
conceptual difficulties, VFM has been central to the entire NPM approach across all sectors 
of national and local government. It became the central and defining focus for how defence 
and its suppliers should interact. In 2005, the then UK Secretary for Defence, Lord Drayson, 
made a statement to Parliament when discussing the Defence Industrial Policy that “value 
for money remains the bedrock of our commercial policy. Competition will remain a major 
element of that, but it will not be used when other tools, such as partnering, would deliver a 
better outcome, or where it would impinge on our operational sovereignty. The defence 
industrial strategy does not signal a move in the direction of protectionism” (Hansard, 2005, 
col. 1466). 
The Secretary for Defence’s quote in the previous paragraph illustrates some of the 
complexities that are involved with the application of NPM principles as applied to defence. 
Neoliberalism draws on neoclassical economics which, in turn, assume that free, 
competitive markets are the best way to generate the efficient use of scarce resources. 
Based on such assumptions, Lord Drayson’s reference to competition is eminently sensible. 
The weakness, however, is that defence markets have not been conforming, and still do not 
conform, to competitive markets. The advent of open global markets has further reduced 
competitive markets to the extent that “70 percent of world trade is managed by just 500 
corporations” (Elliot & Atkinson, 1998, p. 223). This pattern of concentration of power into 
fewer corporations has continued across all institutions, including the defence industry. Over 
the past decade, the growth of the major defence suppliers has been primarily from 
acquisition rather than organic growth. As in all capital intensive industries, the barriers to 
entry are massive and so gaining in size becomes a source of competitive advantage. The 
sophisticated technology associated with defence adds yet another large barrier to entry. In 
a market with fewer and more powerful players, it is hardly surprising that the then Secretary 
of Defence, while pushing competition as the ideologically preferable state, also noted the 
need to enter into commercial negotiations and partnering. The reality of these concentrated 
markets is not easily reconciled with assumptions of competitive markets being the means 
by which to deliver VFM. 
While NPM initially conceived of VFM in cost savings terms, the ever increasing 
dependency on markets saw the concept of VFM expand to include being able to access 
leading edge battle-winning technology through the application of open innovation (OI). OI is 
defined as “a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well 
as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance 
their technology” (Chesbrough, 2003, p. xxiv). OI has demonstrated success in defence with 
respect to smaller assets. For instance, The Economist (“Innovation,” 2009) reported that 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=112 - 
=
the U.S. Air Force ordered 2,200 Sony PlayStation 3 videogame consoles which then 
formed the building block of a supercomputer. Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan used Apple 
iPods and iPhones to run translation software and calculate bullet trajectories. XBox 
videogame controllers have been modified to allow control of reconnaissance robots and 
drone aircraft. Graphic chips that power PC video-cards are being used by defence firms to 
run simulations. In respect to the acquisition of large state-of-the-art assets, there is not yet 
conclusive evidence available to demonstrate that the MoD, or indeed the military of any 
western styled democracy, successfully employs OI principles in respect to large assets. 
The MoD’s (2007) Innovation Strategy: Creating a New Environment for Innovation Within 
the Defence Supply Chain provides conclusive evidence of how the MoD has set about 
implementing a deliberate, clearly articulated, well-funded OI strategy. While the UK’s 
military capability has always been heavily dependent on the strength of the defence supply 
chains, which are in turn supported by privately owned firms, this policy represents a major 
shift in terms of what assets, processes, and services the MoD should, and should not, 
retain. Previously, knowledge linked to innovation was seen as too important to outsource. 
Under the present arrangements, the emphasis has shifted from generating knowledge and 
innovations to how to remain an intelligent customer while possessing less knowledge.  
In parallel with the aforementioned developments, or perhaps in response to them, 
the MoD has also adopted a new strategic planning philosophy known as Through Life 
Capability Management (TLCM). The MoD defines TLCM as “the enduring capability to 
generate a desired operational outcome or effect, and is relative to threat, physical 
environment and the contribution of coalition partners” (MoD, 2007, p. 12). More recently, 
TLCM has been renamed Capability Management (CM). The CM philosophy has radically 
altered how the MoD buys the goods and services needed to generate capability. The 
subtle, yet important, point is that the MoD’s modern acquisition practices are based on 
contracting for capability rather than for an asset. These practices have moved the 
emphasis away from buying goods to buying services. The movement away from goods to 
services is consistent with a view being advanced in the marketing literature by Vargo and 
Lusch (2004). These authors argue the world has moved away from a Goods Dominant 
Logic (GDL) within an economic exchange, to a Service Dominant Logic (SDL) where value 
is co-created in the interactions between the customers’ and suppliers’ networks. Under 
SDL, goods are viewed as physical assets involved primarily in delivering services.  
The work of Vargo and Lusch make it clear that the movement to buying services 
rather than goods is not unique to the military but, rather, is part of a much wider trend 
common to most industries. Under SDL, goods are considered as vehicles by which to 
deliver services. SDL is driven by an innate purpose of doing something for and with another 
party, and argues strongly that value is co-created in the interactions between the 
customers’ and suppliers’ networks. SDL is claimed to provide a complementary explanation 
of how to engage in improved supply chain management (SCM). SDL argues that SCM 
concepts of the 1990s were caught in a GDL perspective. Lusch (2011, p.14) claims that 
“SDL is aligned with Metz’s (1998) observation that SCM is moving into a super role, which 
integrates the functions of marketing, development, product and customer service.” It is 
argued that the evolution toward partnerships and value creation networks in SCM 
demonstrate clear evidence of developments in line with SDL principles (Lusch, 2011; 
Tokman & Bietelspacher, 2011). 
Several forces appear to be in play with the MoD’s move to services. First, NPM’s 
preference to achieve efficiencies through engagement with markets encourages the notion 
of outsourcing the most expensive aspects involved with large assets—the through life 
support services. Second, the adoption of NPM has been accompanied by an increased 
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“privatisation” and “civilianisation” of the military. Numerous examples of an increase in this 
trend can be found. For example, in the first Gulf War, the U.S. forces had one contractor for 
every 50 soldiers. In the second Gulf War, the civilian to military ratio had increased to one 
for every ten soldiers (Avant, 2004). In 2009 the ratio of U.S. uniformed personnel to 
contractors in Afghanistan had risen to 1 to 1. The UK’s ratio as of 2009 was 1 to 0.35. In 
2004, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) employed 700,000 civilians. In 2005, 20,000 
military positions were scheduled to be transferred to civilian employment. In 2009, the ratio 
of uniformed staff to civil servants in the MoD was 2:1 and this ratio represents the strongest 
concentration of civil servants to uniformed staff in Europe. By contrast, France was 5:1. 
Third, the adoption and implementation of a CM approach to planning encourages 
contracting for bundles of services. Finally, the financial crisis has resulted in government 
directing the MoD to further downsize its staff numbers. Apart from being required to lose 
approximately 32,000 uniformed staff (7,460 Navy, 14,640 Army, and 9,820 Air-force), the 
MoD is also required to lose 25,000 of its 87,000 civil servants (Defence Analytical Services 
and Advice, 2010 ). As civil servants tend to provide support services, it is understandable 
that the activities they undertake would be prime targets for outsourcing. The picture is less 
clear as to what functions covered by uniformed personnel will be outsourced, but early 
indications are again that those functions considered to be “support” rather than “core” to 
theatre activities are more likely to go. In short, the MoD’s reduced funding has further 
forced it to move to market-based solutions in order to generate military capability.  
In the past three years, the UK government has acted upon most of the 
recommendations of two major reports—the Gray (2009) report which was aimed 
specifically at acquisition reforms, and the Levene (2011) report which looked at a wide 
range of issues, including acquisition. Interestingly, both reports acknowledged that prior 
reforms had floundered because they had failed to adequately address various cultural 
issues. Gray stressed the need for a greater learning capability while Levene placed 
emphasis on the need for behavioural change. Both reports tended to repeat the 
recommendations of numerous prior reports. These included improving the use of traditional 
engineering control tools such as project management and a systems approach; greater 
discipline of financial controls; better alignment of accountabilities and responsibilities; and, 
unsurprisingly, more outsourcing of procurement activities. While previous reports had also 
made reference to the importance of addressing cultural issues in order to ensure 
successful reform implementation, both the Gray (2009) and Levene (2011) reports implied 
that the past reforms had floundered because they had tended to underestimate the 
importance of “people” factors. Both reports made reference to the need for greater 
professionalism among acquisition practitioners, as well the need to improve organisational 
learning capability (Gray) and to better align behaviours (Levene) with strategic aims. Both 
reports appeared to be advocating that the way to achieve “hard results” is through greater 
application of “soft skills.” In short, there is a need to engage more fully with activities that 
have been traditionally classified as falling under the social sciences. 
When the aforementioned reforms are viewed as a whole, it is hardly surprising to 
conclude that strategic acquisition needs to engage with social science in order to be more 
effective. Outsourcing ever more military tasks to suppliers involves a move away from 
achieving results through command and control structures and toward greater reliance on 
contract management and administration. Employing an open innovation strategy requires 
greater working through social networks in order to create and diffuse the knowledge 
required to generate novel solutions. The inherently multidisciplinary nature of acquisition 
creates yet more motivation to work across conceptual divides as new knowledge and ideas 
are often generated within the spaces between disciplines (Hislop, 2009). The globalisation 
of markets and knowledge workers creates a strong case for greater cultural sensitivity in 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=114 - 
=
order to obtain results. The loss of monopsony with key suppliers who now serve global 
markets suggests that as power can no longer be used to direct suppliers, there is a strong 
case to work more effectively within relationships. This shift in power is especially important 
when it is remembered that the MoD has a very heavy dependency on few suppliers 
operating in a non-competitive market place in order to source the bundles of services it 
requires to deliver capability. Teece et al. (1997) suggest that the most crucial knowledge 
assets are embedded in organizational routines. As outsourcing organizational routines 
therefore involves also losing embedded knowledge, a possible way to counter this risk 
would need to encourage greater openness and trust with suppliers in order to keep abreast 
of current knowledge. The issue of how to manage knowledge in an organizational context 
of decreasing internal knowledge workers creates several issues around how to remain an 
intelligent customer. Encouraging greater openness and trust with suppliers may yet provide 
a different means of remaining an intelligent customer. The fact that these relationships with 
suppliers are often very long term adds greater weight to the need to work in a cooperative 
and collaborative manner. Furthermore, if Vargo and Lusch’s (2004) views are correct, then 
the move from GDL to SDL requires investigating a great deal of effort into integrating 
activities across social networks. For all of these reasons, the move towards greater 
acceptance and use of social science would appear to be self-evident. What is not evident, 
however, is that the introduction of social science in respect to research may prove to be 
problematic for defence acquisition because it challenges many of the foundational 
assumptions of both the military and wider governmental institutional arrangements. 
Social Science and Acquisition 
Science in its strictest sense is often viewed as an ideal pattern or paradigm of 
unfinished perfection: a discipline firmly based in observation, experiment, and 
measurement, all married to a logically integrated body of theory (Chua 1986; Hirschheim & 
Klein, 1992; Johnson & Duberley, 2000). Viewed in this sense, social science is not a 
science, nor is much else. If, however, science is conceived as a loose social institution of 
people who share a common interest in knowledge and the understanding of observable 
phenomena in a given area, who communicate their observations and thoughts, judge these 
observations and thoughts by shared criteria, and obtain their results by a diversity of 
common methods, then it may be possible to include social science as a science (MacRae, 
1964). To date, the governance and management frameworks applied to both private and 
public institutions operating within modern western democracies are guided by a positivist 
(scientific) philosophy. This philosophical stance accepts the first view of science and 
generally rejects the second. On the surface, taking such a stance seems perfectly 
reasonable, arguing that to adopt the latter definition would open institutions up to an 
absence of standards of judgement that would then expose them to the dangers of mere 
ideology, propaganda, and indoctrination. However, this strong and enduring attachment to 
positivism creates potential difficulties for acquisition research wishing to embrace social 
science. The difficulty with definitions is not so much with what they describe but, rather, that 
in the process they also infer what should be investigated. This situation is further 
exacerbated by a paradigmatic definition of a research stance because it tends to not only 
direct what sort of methodologies should be used but also how they should be employed. 
The nub of the issue at stake is, therefore, not over which topics of research to examine (the 
military has generously funded research into social science topics for decades—Caforio, 
2007), but rather how to do so. Positivism claims it is capable of exploring both “hard” and 
“soft” research topics—a point contested by many social scientists (Alvesson, 2002; 
Bhaskar, 1978; Collier, 1994; Flybjerg, 2006). To date, research in respect to acquisition has 
favoured the use of a positivist research paradigm for all topics. 
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Because the term paradigm is itself used well outside its original meaning, it is 
important to briefly define what is meant by the term with respect to research. A definition 
that remains close to Kuhn’s original intent is that of a community of scientists who share “a 
constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques” that “circumscribe definitions of worthwhile 
problems and acceptable scientific evidence” (Chua, 1986, p. 602). Johnson and Duberley 
(2000) argue that there are at least three distinct research paradigms used in management 
research. A research paradigm is determined by the possible combinations of ontology and 
epistemology, as defined in either objective or subjective terms. Johnson and Duberley 
(2000) call epistemology the finding of “frameworks” of warranted scientific knowledge that 
act as a guideline for representations of what knowledge claims can be made. Ontology is 
defined by the same authors as the philosophy of being or what researchers think reality, 
being, and existence are. The point to be made for this present discussion is that positivism 
takes the position that there is an objective ontology and epistemology. Theorists who take a 
more critical stance argue that while there is an objective ontology (reality exists 
independently of the humans who observe it), we are limited in what we can discover about 
reality because epistemology is subjective and, therefore, flawed. Postmodernists reject any 
grand narrative that makes claims about truth and therefore take the view that both ontology 
and epistemology are subjective. Viewed this way, positivism is but one of many 
perspectives through which to explore the social world.  
The implications of limiting acquisition research to a single paradigm are related in 
large part to how acquisition is defined. If acquisition is viewed, like management, as being 
best conceived of as an art and a science, then it opens up the paradigmatic debate. If it is 
seen as only a science, then continuation with status quo research arrangements may be 
adequate. However, as numerous reports (Gray, 2009; Levene, 2011; National Audit Office, 
2009) to the MoD have stressed the importance of social factors, it seems the pure science 
stance is unsustainable. If, as many social scientists suggest (Bhaskar, 1978), positivism is 
poorly equipped to deal with complex social research matters, then its dominant use may 
also be limiting the development of the body of knowledge needed to inform and improve 
acquisition practices. At the heart of this dispute is the view that natural systems and social 
systems do not behave in the same way. Positivism is seen to assume a closed system view 
of the world, whereas social systems are seen to be open systems with constantly emerging 
properties (Collier, 1994). Natural sciences aim to discover and define laws that work across 
all contexts. Social science practised outside a positivist tradition is more likely to aspire to 
locating and describing tendencies that are highly context-dependent. The criticism, 
therefore, comes down to the claim that the ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
positivism create a conceptual blindness in the researcher as they impose a closed system 
view on a dynamic, non-linear, open, social system.  
Given the importance of the term system in this debate, a brief overview of possible 
meanings that can be assigned to this term are explored. Jackson (2003) states “a system is 
a complex whole, the functioning of which depends on its parts and the interactions between 
those parts” (p. 3). This core definition applies to a vast array of different types of systems 
such as physical (e.g., river systems), biological (e.g., living organisms), designed (e.g., 
automobiles), abstract, (e.g., philosophical systems), and social (e.g., family). For the 
purposes of this discussion, the two dimensions of interest for defining systems are those 
that align with natural science (defined as technical ranging from simple to complex) and 
social science (defined as social broken into three types—unitary, pluralist, and coercive). 
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Figure 1. A Systems Theory Typology 
The key point to draw from Figure 1 is that changes in either the technical or social 
dimensions alter the nature of the system under examination. Furthermore, as the nature of 
the system changes, so should the research paradigm being employed to investigate the 
system under inquiry. Therefore, exploring simple and complex systems may suit positivism. 
Investigation of simple and complex pluralist systems may lead to richer insights if a critical 
(objective ontology and subjective epistemology) research paradigm was employed. 
Research into simple and coercive systems may be best served by the use of a 
postmodernist paradigm. Social science researchers generally consider these distinctions to 
be extremely important as the paradigmatic stance taken is seen to have a profound impact 
both on what is found and how it is analysed. 
Numerous reports have also made mention of the need for acquisition practitioners 
to be more professional. While these same reports have been less clear about what is 
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meant by the term professional, the wider literature on this topic makes it clear that 
professions have access to a body of knowledge which they develop and, in some cases 
such as law and medicine, often self-regulate. If the views of these social scientists are 
accepted, then it follows that acquisition, as a body of knowledge that is becoming 
increasingly dependent on social factors in order to deliver results, must also give far more 
consideration to the sorts of research paradigms it employs. Further, as acquisition activities 
would appear to operate in several of the systems defined in Figure 1, then there is a sound 
case to widen the range of research paradigms used in order to generate a greater array of 
insights. However, the findings of these various research initiatives will be squandered if the 
proponents of different paradigms do not have a means of effectively sharing information 
with each other. Without this ability, there is a risk that discussions will revert to the all too 
familiar paradigm wars and the trading of insults rather than insights. The challenge for 
acquisition is, therefore, not only to master being interdisciplinary in practice but also multi-
paradigmatic in research activities. A small but increasing body of writers outside acquisition 
have been arguing for the need to put an end to the paradigm wars (Mingers, 2004). As a 
latecomer to this paradigmatic debate, acquisition has one distinct advantage—it may be 
able to use the insights previously gained from other bodies of knowledge, thereby avoiding 
these wars and moving on instead to the much needed task of multidisciplinary theory 
development. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate whether the traditional research 
methodologies previously employed to examine procurement phenomena were adequate for 
modern acquisition practices. The conclusion reached is that they were probably not. The 
reason being that despite the wide acceptance of the increasingly important role played by 
social factors in determining acquisition success, acquisition research had not expanded in 
the range of research methodologies needed to keep pace with these developments. These 
developments have been driven by multiple factors such as three decades of 
implementation of NPM combined with the end of the Cold War and the knock-on effects of 
the global financial crisis. The combined effect has been to fundamentally alter how the 
military can generate capability. The increasing dependence of the MoD on fewer, powerful, 
global suppliers for not only equipment but also an increasing array of services (including 
knowledge and innovations), and demand for greater professionalism among acquisition 
practitioners, means that the role of acquisition has become highly strategic and relevant to 
the sustainability of core military functions. Numerous reports suggest that in order for 
acquisition to be more effective, it must also become more adept in dealing with complex 
social systems. This requirement has, in turn, generated a need for more research into how 
to best engage with the social systems. The simplest, but by no means the most effective, 
solution would be to increase the research into these phenomena but not alter the research 
paradigm. The difficulty with maintaining this status quo research approach is that it is 
unclear how such an approach would lead to new insights. The suggestion advanced in this 
paper is that if the acquisition field wants to better understand the social factors involved in 
acquisition, it will need to engage more of the practices used in social science. This will 
require the employment of a wider range of research paradigms. Clearly, such a change in 
approach will generate a raft of fresh challenges with no guarantee of reward for effort. 
When weighted against the option of continuing with what has gone before, it appears that 
the acquisition field has little option but to widen the research paradigms employed. To do 
otherwise would likely ensure that the expectations currently being placed on the acquisition 
function can never be met. 
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